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This paper is focused  using the example of the Czech Republic since 1993  on a
description of the hidden risks, implicitly existing in the system of public finances during
the transition period (from a centrally planned towards market economy). The starting
assumption is that public budgets have in time of economic transition certain specific
functions. These consist explicitly in supporting the transitional process by transferring
part of the economic and social costs, attached to it, over time and various categories of
population. These functions are to be carried out at time, when the economic
performance of those countries tends to be rather poor and the revenue side of the
budgets is not buoyant. Since the financial capacity of the budget is restraint, governments
try to find ways by which transition functions could be carried out while their financing
would not take the form of instant cash outlays.
Evidence of the Czech Republic suggests that measures, conceived to meet the
expectations attached to the budget in respect to part of the transitional costs, though
conceived originally as temporary, tend over time to become of a permanent nature.
Issues such as a risk of moral hazard then occur.
The analysis also points to the fact that these sorts of phenomena may not be the only
factor that contributed to the deterioration of the Czech public finance in recent years.
The evidence of fiscal developments in quite a number of transitional economies
suggests that elements of these features tend to exist in most of those countries.
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^1. Statement of Facts
From the very first days of the independence of the Czech Republic its fiscal policy was
characterised by a relatively high standard of discipline. It applies mainly to respecting two
principles: the principle of drawing up the state budget with revenues balancing the
expenditures and the principle of gradual reduction of the size of government in terms of
projected revenues and expenditures share in GDP . The public budgets in the first three
years posted consolidated surpluses ranging from CZK 27 bn in 1993 to less than CZK 5 bn
in 1995, i.e. from 2.6% to 0.4% GDP [1]. From 1996, however, the rate of deficit has been
increasing gradually up to roughly CZK 20 bn in 1997 and CZK 43,5 bn in 1998, that is to
say up to 1.2% and 2.4% GDP , respectively.
The relatively small internal debt was manifested in low cost of debt service. With the
GDP growth, the rate of the officially published gross public debt declined from 19% in
1993 down to 13% in 1997.
Structural disproportions lurked behind the overall relatively favourable results.
Surpluses of current revenues compared to non-investment expenditures were
decreasing in the public budgets. A decrease was recorded also in the share of investment
expenditures in both the total budget and GDP . Significant problems start to cumulate in
the state budget itself.
Since 1997, a deficit on the so-called pension account has appeared as a new
phenomenon, following a reduction in social insurance contribution rates. The
growing share of social expenditures and mainly pension benefits has started to pose
the continuous budgetary trap. The inclusion of other mandatory items (such as
liabilities related to the Czech Republics joining the NATO) made even narrower the
already limited space to cover the remaining budgetary needs. Indebtedness of cities
and municipalities accelerated. The declared budget discipline per se did not ensure
an actual fiscal discipline. A number of potential liabilities of the state, and inherent
fiscal risks in regard to the stability of public finances were either removed outside
the budget system altogether, or the act of resolving them was put off for a later
time.
Until now the budgets did not clash with reference values of the Maastricht
convergence criteria as regards rates of deficit (23% GDP) and of indebtedness (13%
officially, but estimated at roughly double that figure when hidden debts are included). Yet
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[1] Using IMF Financial Statistics; consolidated balance is adjusted for net lending minus repayments within
the governmental sector framework.open and hidden problems manifested themselves more acutely when economic growth
ground down to a halt and downturn occurred with accompanying revenues slowdown
and undiminished demand for increased budget expenditures. The drastic budget cuts as
executed by the 1997 austerity measures were but a one-time solution which worst
impacted the capital expenses chapter with multiplying effects on slowing down
economic growth. Deeper reforms with long-term effects were not possible to bring
about in such a brief period and they continue to constitute an open, unanswered
challenge.
As compared to other transitional economies the Czech Republic has maintained
a relatively stable budgetary position and high level of budgetary discipline, particularly
as regards the state budget. At the same time, however, financial discipline within the
whole system of public finances was substantially looser  from 1996 the whole
system recorded deficits. The state budget has traditionally been set to balance
revenues and expenditures even though the out turn has been a modest deficit since
1997. Only in 1999, was the state budget drawn up for the first time with a planned
deficit, amounting to 1.7 % of GDP (and 2.6 % of GDP for total public budgets). 
Table 1 provides a description of the developments of the state (central) budget. The
system of public finance in the Czech Republic comprises naturally an extensive number
of additional components, such as district and municipal budgets, several extra-budgetary
funds (including the so-called National Property Fund). All these budgetary units would
have to be incorporated into the calculation of the balance of general government fiscal
activities. The overall picture of the public finance system would then appear in an even
worst light.
The main concluding statement based on the time series of aggregate budget figures
can be formulated as follows: foundations of the negative trends (including the growing
imbalance of public budgets) have been laid down in past years but adverse features of
these trends can be seen more clearly only at present. Moreover, those trends may be
prolonged even in the next medium-term period.
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Revenues 439,968 482,817 508,951 537,411 574,112 552,650
Expendit. 432,738 484,379 524,668 566,741 605,127 599,995
Balance 7,230 -1,562 -15,717 -29,330 -31,015 -47,345
Table 1. Developments of the State Budget in 19951998 and in 1999 (in mil. of CZK)2. Classification of Factors
Now when we have established the quantitative framework of the development of
the budget situation it is important to identify factors that are or may be contributing to
the permanent deterioration of the balance of fiscal activities. Though they are quite
numerous, the most important could be identified and classified as follows:
1. Disproportions at the revenue and expenditure sides of the budget.
2. Atomisation of the public finance system.
3. Existence of "grey" zones of activities that formally lie outside the public finance
system but whose activities are guaranteed and balances paid for by the state.
4. Existence of contingent liabilities in the form of guarantees issued by public
authorities (central or even local governments, budgetary or even extra-budgetary
funds etc).
2.1. Disproportions at the Revenue and Expenditure Sides of the 
Budget
These disproportions are leading, among other things, to asymmetric reactions of the
revenue and expenditures to fluctuations of the business cycle. They consist namely of:
2.1.1. On the Revenue Side
Inadequate performance of taxation system, autonomously declining tax quota,
driven by the following facts:
1. Definition of the tax base, where two problems occur mostly:
 part of taxes (excises) are defined ad valorem (is attached to the natural 
consumption);
 for income taxes, the tax base is very volatile (fluctuations of real wage 
increases, volatility of corporate profits depending of several factors etc).
2. The tax base is being continuously eroded since the new tax structure has been
implemented 1993, both in terms of:
 population of tax-payers (aging of population, restructuring of the industrial 
and service sectors etc);
 accounting definition of the base for the calculation of due taxes.
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^2.1.2. On the Expenditure Side
The problem lies in the so-called mandatory expenditures, namely:
1. High share of the so-called mandatory expenditures in the total volume of the state
budget expenditures:
  it relates mainly to social welfare expenditures, but;
 public budgets or state budget are burdened also by other mandatory 
expenditures; in particular, growth of debt service expenditures (interests and 
fees) seems to be a risk factor and it can accelerate in case of getting into 
large-scale debts.
2. Indexation of the most relevant components of mandatory expenditures.
2.2. Atomisation of the Public Finance System
Compared to some other transitional countries, the Czech public finance system may
appear as not so much fragmented:
 the fiscal federalism arrangements consist of a three tier budgetary system (central
state budget, budgets of districts  about eighty  and then budgets of municipalities);
 moreover, on the revenue side, the fiscal jurisdiction of the lower tiers of
governments has so far been extremely limited (practically to the local fees, yet within
predetermined limits);
 though districts and municipalities enjoy an extensive autonomy over their
borrowing policies, there are strong systemic incentives for them not to abuse of that
autonomy;
 the number of extra-budgetary funds is limited and their total quantitative role is
(with the exception of the National Property Fund) marginal;
 the public health insurance system is subject to a process of concentration of
various funds;
 there exist a number of so-called "transformation" institutions (in substance and for
the most part of their activities these are bad-loan hospitals, created in connection with
the stabilisation of the corporate and banking sectors), but this number is not so high and
those institutions are well controlled by the state (or, alternatively in one case by the
central bank);
 there are practically no quasi-fiscal activities of the central bank.
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as in other countries, it still represents a potential risk for the fiscal stability of the country.
The problem relates not so much to a number of elements the system contains but how
those various elements are managed and controlled. It is also important what power has the
government to regulate the balance of their activities. Last but not least, the construction and
management of the system of public finance should be subjected to a strong fiscal discipline
in confrontation with the basic economic policy choices of the government. If the system
does not contain sufficient disciplining provisions, the government may be tempted to
underestimate the efficiency argument when deciding to commit the budgetary funds.
From this prospective, the Czech experience provides at least two interesting
examples of the absence of disciplining fiscal environment: 
a) evolution of temporary "transformation" institutions into permanent ones,
combined with an extensive use of their functions to "resolve" issues, for which they were
not designed (see section 2.3. of this paper);
b) increasing process of moving present budgetary obligations towards future via
sovereign (or similar) guarantees (see section 2.4. of this paper).
2.3. Existence of "Grey" Zones of Activities that Formally Lie 
Outside the Public Finance System but Have Guarantees of 
the Government
There are four main so-called "transformation" institutions that have been created in
the past in the Czech Republic to address some of the outstanding issues of the economic
transition. These are:
 the National Property Fund (agency, primarily founded to technically channel state
owned asset to private investors according to privatisation decisions approved by the
government);
 the Consolidation Bank (Konsolidacní Banka), primarily founded to extend the
maturity of and reduce the interest charged for loans, issued in the past to finance part of
the working capital of enterprises;
 the Czech settlement unit (Ceská inkasní), designed to improve the structure of risk
weighted loans at the CSOB (Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka  Czechoslovak
Commercial Bank, originally specialised in foreign trade financing and carrying over
foreign financial activities of the government);
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^ the Czech financial unit (Ceská Financní), designed by the central bank to assist in
the stabilisation of small banks in the Czech Republic.
All of these institutions enjoy implicit guarantees of the government. The impact of
their activities on the budget has two dimensions:
a) First, for a given year, net public spending by transformation institutions includes
cash outlays on new programs in the form of directed credits and asset purchases and
interest expenditures; and is adjusted for debt collection and other revenue from
programs and for interest revenue.
b) Second, state guarantees reflect the amount of hidden subsidies and default risk of
the guaranteed loans.
There are two distinct periods in the life of the "transformation" institutions:
a) Until 1993, off-budget programs had mainly dealt with pre-transition problems
inherited by the banking sector. These programs had been financed through
Konsolidacní Banka, which was capitalized by the National Property Fund, and
borrowed from the Czech National Bank. In 1995, the Ministry of Finance established
Ceská Inkasní, a non-banking financial institution, to clean-up portfolio of a state-
owned bank (CSOB). Covered by a guarantee issued by the National Property Fund,
Ceská Inkasní took a credit from CSOB and used this credit to purchase CSOBs bad
assets at face value.
b) The second phase relates to years 19961998, when the new bank
consolidation and stabilisation program has been launched in order to deal with the
newly emerging problems of the banking sector. In order to implement these
programs, the Czech National Bank established Ceská Financní, a non-banking
financial institution.
Aside from the bank rescue operations, Konsolidacní Banka and, less directly, the
National Property Fund has also financed government programs to support troubled
insurance companies, public hospitals and the Czech Railways, to build infrastructure, and
to clean up industrial enterprises before privatisation. The National Property Fund has
partly financed these programs from privatisation revenues but partly also from an
issuance of bonds.
The troubling fact about these institutions and their operations under the implicit
state guarantee is connected with the rapidly increasing level of contingent public
liabilities. These liabilities have been accumulated outside the budgetary system mainly by
"transformation" institutions, as they had to borrow in order to finance their activities.
Table 2 shows approximate levels of contingent public liabilities, connected with their
existence.
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^Off-budget programs, such as guarantees and support extended through Konsolidacní
Banka, National Property Fund and other agencies impose cost on taxpayers with a delay
but with no discount. As it has already started to happen, past hidden deficits and
servicing of the hidden public debt outside the budgetary system gradually generates
claims on government budget.
The banking sector remains a major source of claims on government financial
support.
There are at present three major banks, still controlled by the state (the sale of the
state stake into one of them, CSOB, should to be completed in June 1999). Whether or
not activities of these banks have been politically motivated, those large banks residually
owned by the state suffer, to various extent, from a weak loan portfolio and continue to
rely on state support. The most troubled banks include the Czech Savings Bank and
Komercní Banka.
As an illustration of the state support to those bank, the following example is
given: in December 1998 Konsolidacní Banka transferred CZK 4 bn to the Czech
Savings Bank to cover its losses (thus increasing its own losses by CZK 4 bn) and
purchased bad assets from Czech Savings Bank in the amount of CZK 6.5 bn. In
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1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Konsolidacní  Banka (KOB)
(net of provisions  and reserves)
52 49 30 31 53 85
Ceská Inkasníi (CI)
(net of provisions  and reserves)
26 26 24 20 18
National  Property Fund (NPF) 29 33 40 22 17 15
State guarantees
(risk adjusted  guarantees  outstanding)
3 3 6 28 74 107
Contingent  public  liabilities
(net of provisions  and reserves)
84 111 102 105 164 225
Contingent  public  liabilities (%  of GDP)
(net of provisions  and reserves)
8.4 9.7 7.5 6.9 9.9 12.7
Provisions  and reserves  of KOB  and CI 19 24 42 59 71 84
Gross hidden public liabilities
(not adjusted for  provisions  and reserves)
103 135 144 164 235 309
Reported  gross government  debt 159 162 154 155 173 210
Reported  gross government  debt (%  of GDP) 15.8 14.1 11.5 10.1 10.5 11.8




^addition, Konsolidacní Banka issued subordinated debt for Czech Savings Bank in the
amount of CZK 5.5 bn to help the Czech Savings Bank to meet its capital adequacy
requirement. Table 3 shows the worrying development in government exposure to the risks
emerging in the three large state-owned banks. In the context of past developments, this
table indicates that the process of privatisation of these banks is likely to absorb further public
resources, possibly exceeding any revenues realised from their privatisation.
Altogether, off-budget programs contribute only marginally to achieving main policy
objectives of the government and, in some instances, may even undermine these
objectives. A brief overview suggests that many off-budget programs, such as bailing out
banks and health insurance companies, have done the latter. Sometimes, programs, which
did not qualify for budgetary support (for example, an additional subsidy to Railways) did
qualify for assistance outside the budget (such as a very risky guarantee extended to
Railways). Moreover, these programs have often imply that government will help again in
a case of future failures, and thus generate moral hazard among market agents, reducing
their incentives to improve productivity and competitiveness. This way, the objective of
EU accession and integration with European markets, which poses high requirements on
competitiveness of banks and enterprises in the Czech economy, may have been
undamaged.
"Transformation" institutions serve the government as the channel of pursuing
restructuring programs without much scrutiny and in a costly manner (compared to
budgetary decisions). Without Parliamentary and public scrutiny, the government has
the authority to pursue programs of all sorts and in unlimited amounts. Since the
government guarantees its obligations, for example, Konsolidacní Banka is able to
13















Czech Savings Bank 45.0 33.4 44.7 17.5 41.2
Komercní  Banka 48.7 54.1 92.8 30.1 66.5
CSOB 65.7 13.8 27.4 16.3 37.0
Total 101.3 164.9 63.9 144.7
Government  exposure
(% of GDP)
6.1 10.0 3.6 8.1
Table 3. Government Implicit Risk Exposure in Large Banks: Amounts of Loss
and Classified Loans, 19971998 (CZK bn)
Source: Banks Annual Reports
^
^
^borrow in the markets and finance as many programs as requested even though it is
unable to repay its debts without future support from the state budget.
The problem with policies, which are not incorporated into the state budget, lies in
the minimum transparency of their costs and final fiscal consequences. It manifests itself
at five levels as follows:
 The first level involves a macroeconomic problem  that is the sustainability of
public finances over the medium term; this is also a problem of the clear identification of
the goals and instruments of fiscal and monetary policies and their consequences.
 At the second level this is a political problem of decision-making process regarding
the priorities of spending public money. Decisions regarding state interventions and
programs implemented outside of the official budget need not necessarily be based on a
thorough evaluation of their costs and effects. 
 At the third level this involves high costs of implementation and financing
programs outside the state budget. This is connected with the problematic
supervision of the economical activities and management of the "transformation"
institutions and bears on the likely greater costs of their refinancing in comparison
with the state debt.
 At the fourth and possibly the most important level this is a problem involving the
irresponsible conduct of the banks, enterprises, and other entities and involves the
deformation of the markets what results in repeated and, therefore, anticipated financial
rescue interventions by the state.
 Finally, at the fifth level, the methods of financing such government policies have
varying monetary impacts.
At all five levels, there is the problem of not complete legal and institutional
frameworks, which define the adoption, implementation, and financing of government
policies outside of the state budget. Therefore, solving the problem of a hidden state
debt must necessarily involve the creation of such a legal and institutional framework,
which would prevent a further development of such state interventionism, increase of
potential state obligations, and its financing outside of the framework of official budget
process. This is necessary not only for the support of long-term stability of public
finances, but also for correct evaluation of the cost of the individual government
programs, facilitating public control of government policies, supporting the efficiency
of management of the quasi-budget institutions, which implement such programs, and
creating healthy stimuli for the economic agents.
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^2.4. Existence of Contingent Liabilities in the Form of Guarantees 
Issued by Public Authorities [2]
Guarantees represent a very dynamic component of the Czech fiscal system and the
preferred instrument of government policies since mid of 1990s when fiscal balance
went under a pressure. The system of guarantees, issued by public authorities is quite
complicated at least in the following respects:
 guarantees are issued by many different authorities at different levels of the public
administration structure (central government but also municipalities);
 guarantees are also issued by the off-budgetary funds attached through the balance
of their activities to the budget;
 while there is at least some specification of the purpose and limits of state
guarantees in the law, applying to activities of the central government, lower tiers are in
this respect not regulated at all;
 given the complicated financing channels, used by different "transformation"
institutions, there exists an equally complicated system of mutual and multiple
guarantees, issued occasionally by those same institutions or the state itself.
The system of guarantees is not well regulated and represents an area, through which
a government may avoid the disciplining pressure of the balance of fiscal activities. Almost
no statutory and regulatory procedures guide the governments exposure to risks. The
government of the Czech Republic has very broad authority to issue state guarantees and
accept other off-budget obligations. With respect to state guarantees, the law authorizes
the government to extend state guarantees "designed to finance government-approved
development programs" without requiring estimates of future potential budget claims
and, more broadly, without any public policy framework.
This shortcoming has created an incentive for the spending ministries and budgetary
institution unable to secure the desired level of state assistance through the regular
budget to seek state assistance through loan guarantees. The additional state assistance
provided via guarantees is perceived as cost free and is not included in the overall financial
support provided to a given sector (e.g., agriculture and transport). In some cases,
guarantees are even extended for purposes that are not authorized under the broad
authority of the law. They do not cover development programs, but aim at stabilising the
financial situation of the beneficiary.
The amount of issued guarantees is not subject to meaningful limits. The law sets that
the sum of instalment payments due within a calendar year cannot exceed 8 percent of
15
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[2] Identified by the Czech government in April 1999.expected state budget revenues. This limit is extremely high and not very meaningful. For
1999, the limit allows for about CZK 47 bn of instalment payments, compared to the
scheduled CZK 12 bn. Other EU applicant countries place much tighter limits on
guarantees, such as 1 percent of budget revenues as a limit for new guarantees issued in
a given year in Hungary.
Guarantee approval process is weak. Proposed guarantees are presented to the
Ministry of Finance by the spending ministries. Then the Ministry of Finance analyses the
viability of the proposed project and the borrowers potential ability to repay the
proposed guaranteed loan. However, no mechanism encourages the Ministry of Finance
to assess a high-risk project as non-viable. Once a project is determined to be viable, it
has to be approved by the government. In this process, guarantees are often extended as
a result of emergency and eminent political pressure rather than as a result of a strategic
decision to support certain outcomes at a given price and against other competing claims
on public resources.
The government requires almost no risk sharing by lending institution, which creates
a moral hazard problem. As a result of the governments acceptance of virtually all credit
risk, the role of the private lending institution is reduced to that of a loan distributor. The
lender disregards the credit quality of the borrower. Borrowers tend to neglect risks of
projects, which are covered by government guarantee. In the case of default, the
borrower negotiates with the government rather than the lender, because the lender
does not have a stake in the loan performance. Risks are not properly monitored. The
Ministry of Finance provides only limited oversight of outstanding guaranteed loans.
No reserves are set-aside in advance for expected guarantee claim payment. Each
year the Ministry of Finance estimates the expected claim payments in the upcoming year.
Given the pressure to present a balanced budget, incentives are created to make an
optimistic estimate of expected claims in the upcoming year. 
The lack of reserves to cover future guarantee claims results in producing "shocks" to
the state budget. As guaranteed loans default, resources must immediately be found
within the state budget, potentially requiring substantial and unexpected reductions in
other state programs.
The lack of a requirement to establish loan loss reserves allows loan guarantees to
avoid the discipline of the budget process and creates tremendous incentives to issue
guarantees, because they do not require budgetary resources in the current year.  As a
result, substantially higher budgetary resources may be required in future years to pay for
defaulted guarantees. Therefore, the current guarantee structure distorts the decision
making process and encourages policy makers to make decisions today that may severely
limit the options of future policy makers.
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^3. Assumptions of Regaining Medium-term Stability
of General Government
Identified trends in the public finance sphere demonstrate that deficit will not be
eliminated by restoration of an economic growth only although marked improvement of
economic performance would somehow modify the above tendencies. In order to
restore stability of public finances it is necessary to undertake the following steps
addressing their structural weaknesses: 
 to carry out reform of the tax system aimed not in increasing the tax rates but at
such a change in taxation structure that will lead to an increased elasticity of tax yields
related to development of economic fundamentals and, consequently, to improved
operation of the tax structure as an in-built stabilizer;
 to undertake the reform of spending programs;
 to assess existing subsidy programs and contain those where purposefulness and
efficiency of spending is not demonstrated;
 to accept only programs and projects, comprising calculation of effects, costs and a
clear definition regarding resources of their financing either by savings in existing spending
programs, or by proposing new resources;
 not to introduce new spending programs that work against the started reform
trends and against the need to harmonize spending policies with those of the EU;
 to define clear budget priorities, in order not to allow for their depreciation in the
course of budget execution and to concentrate budget funds in a smaller number of high-
quality programs; to monitor link-up with requirements presented to the European
Commission agencies (co-financing) and NATO;
 to strengthen all forms of scrutiny while concentrating on pre-examination of the
proposed projects in the stage of preparation of a draft budget;
 to support program budgeting and fix strictly methodical conditions for inclusion of
programs into budgets.
In order to meet the above targets, it will be necessary to develop a comprehensive
and well-articulated medium-term fiscal strategy. This is important not only as a part of
the EU accession program, but also in order to address the mounting pressures from
mandatory expenditure programs and limit fiscal risk associated with the existing
contingent liabilities and potential costs of bank privatization and Czech economy
restructuring.
The development of medium-term fiscal framework with inclusion of contingent
liabilities and off-budget activities into the budgetary process is only a one of the
necessary steps. It is also important to be concerned about the looming demographic
17
Studies & Analyses CASE No. 180  Present and future ...time bomb that will destabilize the current parameters of the pension system and to
initiate, at this very moment, changes in the pension system to make it sustainable. 
Comprehensive structural reforms in financial and industrial sectors including their
institutional dimension and legal framework are also an inevitable part of restoration of
public finance stability. The main problems are as follows:
 survival of large, inefficient and excessively indebted corporations lies at the heart
of the current economic malaise with corresponding impact on public finances;
 privatization of banks is central to building an efficient financial and industrial system
that should no more burden general government expenditures or make for potential
fiscal risks;
 it is necessary to accelerate privatization both of strategic non-financial enterprises
and of remaining state owned shares in smaller firms and to pursue maximization of its
fiscal effects.
18
Studies & Analyses CASE No. 180  Pavel tepánek, Ondrej Schneider
^
^Attachment 1
Types of Fiscal Risks
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Budgeted  revenues  and
expenditures  within the
framework  of annual
budgets  such as:
Paying off the direct state
debt
Salaries  and other benefits
for employees  of public
administration
Expenditures for  pensions,
health care, and social
welfare
Expenditures for  law-
mandated  programs
Losses and obligations  connected  with the
state's assumption  of claims within the
framework  of reorganisation,  consolidation,  and
stabilisation  programs  accepted by  the
government
Losses and guarantees  issued by  specialised
institutions  such as  the Bank  of Consolidation,
the Czech  Encashment  Corporation,  and the
Czech Financial  Corporation
State guarantees for bank  loans made to  public
and private  entities
State guarantee  in favour of the Czech  National
Bank to  support  the banking  consolidation  and
stabilisation program
Losses and unfulfilled  obligations  of the Export
Guarantee  and Insurance  Corporation  and the
Czech Export Bank20












Expenditures  in future
budgets  within the
framework  of long-term
capital and other
programs  such as  long-
term financial  costs to
complete  and operate
public capital programs
which have been begun
Losses and obligations  incurred by  the Fund for
National  Property
Ad hoc promises to  compensate  private  entities for
losses based on  old government  obligations
(preferentially  treated " social" loans; legally
mandated  insurance  of the responsibility for
operating motor  vehicles)
Ad hoc promises  of the government to  compensate
private  entities for  losses resulting  from new
obligations (as a  result of privatisation  or as a
result of taking over failing banks and other
enterprises)
CNB losses resulting  from claims against  the NBS
(National Bank  of Slovakia)  resulting  from the
breakup  of the federation
CNB losses resulting  from loans to  clients
(state enterprises  or enterprises  resulting  from
their privatisation)
Additional  financial  aid to banks in difficulty
Unplanned  financial  aid to public institutions, for
example, to  hospitals,  schools,  and other
"public-interest"  institutions  in difficulty
Compensation  of losses suffered by  the Czech-
Moravian  Guarantee  and Developmental Bank
Compensation  of obligations
(guarantees)  provided by  the Farmer  and
Forester  Support  and Guarantee Fund21







Compensation  of losses suffered by  health
insurance  facilities
Assumption  of unfulfilled  obligations
of local and regional  governments
(financial  obligations  and obligations to
provide  certain  services)
Financial  aid for large and economically
important  enterprises  in difficulty (for
example,  the Czech  Railroads  or even private
important  regional  employers)
Promises to  compensate  property
damage, for  example,  the CSOB
(Czechoslovak  Commercial Bank)  in its
relationship  with the Slovak Encashment
Corporation  or the CP (Czech  Insurance
Institution)  in its relationship  with the legally
mandated  insurance  of the responsibility for
damage  caused by motor  vehicles
Obligations  of loan cooperatives
(Kampelicky)
Expenditures for  eradicating  ecological
damage
State assistance  at times of natural  disasters
In the extreme  case, financial  assistance to
save the stability  of the balance  of payments,
the monetary  and payments system
(collaboration  with the CNB  and a possible
state guarantee for  international  stabilisation
loans)
Attachment 2 (see page 33)Fiscal Policy Outlook 19982005
by Ondrej Schneider
Abstract
We analyze the Czech fiscal policy outlook. The analysis confirms the truly dire
condition of the Czech state budget. Revenues share of the GDP is plummeting, as
corporate taxes decline further and consumption taxes lag behind nominal GDP growth.
Expenditures, contrarily, are set to rise; the easy cuts have already been made, social
expenditures swell as the population ages, and past debts are slowly maturing. All
combined, we foresee deficits of about 5% of annual GDP in the coming years. The state
debt would therefore collectively balloon to roughly 60% of GDP within a decade.
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^1. Czech Fiscal Minefield
Czechs thought that they could have the best of all possible worlds: lowered
taxes, balanced public budgets and a decent social security system. They knew it
would take a miracle, as these were not mundane goals. When first cracks in the
blushing economic facade began to appear, a sophisticated system of hidden, off-
budget funds was built. As the 1996 election approached, social security
expenditures were stepped up. Now, the whole fiscal system is seemingly headed for
a crash/collapse. What comes next? Looking at Czech fiscal policy, we cannot see any
easy remedies, as the gap between revenues and expenditures stretch to 5% of GDP .
In such times, tinkering at the edge of the disaster offers little and fundamental
reforms are needed.
What went wrong? The seeds of the current fiscal tension were planted in the early
90s when the tax system was overhauled and a new social security system established.
While tax revenues were tied to the nominal GDP , expenditures have since moved more
in sync with nominal wages. This is a common feature of many tax systems in Europe and
should not be any problematic. The Czech Republic, however, has meanwhile become
famous for its lax corporate governance, a feature of which was rapid wage growth as
opposed to aggressive restructuring or layoffs. Thanks to the fiscal system, high wage
growth has translated into collapsing corporate taxes, rapidly growing social expenditures
and, eventually, to the growing gap between budget revenues and expenditures (see
Chart 1).
Problems were kept under wraps for several years. In 1994 and 1995, budget
revenues were supplemented by transfers from the National Property Fund (in an
amount of about 1% of GDP). The fiscal system was further "augmented" by an excessive
system of off-budget funds to which various expenditures had been tunneled without
proper consolidation. The official government budgets have thus become very
incomplete. We should stress, however, that we have analyzed the future central
government budgets only, as off-budget funds are fiendishly difficult to predict as their
expenditures are overwhelmingly discretionary and may change dramatically in a very
short time.
The system came under attack first in 1996 when the budget slipped into a deficit
even when "surplus money" from 1995 was transferred to 1996 revenues. In 1997,
the budget accumulated a deficit of CZK 16 bil. (1% of GDP), but only after an
enormous effort was devoted to slashing budget expenditures by CZK 40 bil. (2.5%
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economy contracted by 2.7%, the budget itself showed a deficit of "only" CZK 31 bil.
(1.7% of GDP).
We may consider 1998 as the last in a series of "conservative" budgets  when the
government sought balanced budgets at almost any price and often played loose with
economic logic toward that end. Budgets in 1997 and 1998 were fairly restrictive, as the
government eagerly cut expenditures in line with decreasing revenues. The governments
share in GDP thus fell by two percentage points in two years. Since 1999, the driving
philosophy has changed. A balanced budget is no longer seen as sacrosanct and,
meanwhile, accumulated debts emerge. Combined with the aggressive spending plans of
the new government, a combustible mix has been produced. The government
expenditures share in GDP will begin to grow again in 1999 and will edge upward in the
future. The central government deficit will reach beyond 3% of GDP very quickly and is
headed toward a 5% level in the near future.
2. Past: Slowly Growing Deficits
Why do budget revenues under perform expenditures? We have analyzed the past
patterns of main expenditure and revenue items of state budgets. Table 1 illustrates
the underlying trends: while the current expenditures were growing faster than
nominal GDP , revenues lagged by almost two percentage points. The most rapid
growth experienced was in social security expenditures, whose growth exceeded
nominal GDP growth by six percentage points. So much for radical neo-liberal
economic reform in the Czech Republic. Most laggardly were defense expenditures,
which grew by a paltry 3.2% on average, and interest payments, which remained low
due to a low level of debt.
The second part of the table dismisses the common notion that tax collection in the
Czech Republic was ineffectual and that a shift occurred away from direct taxes. With the
exemption of corporate taxes, which were indeed collapsing, the tax collection was quite
efficient. Personal taxes grew by a robust 17% annually, as did social contributions. Value-
added-tax revenues lagged slightly behind the nominal GDP growth, while excise taxes
grew vigorously.
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^3. Future: Fast Deficits
The future offers a similarly bleak picture. As social expenditure out-paces GDP
growth, defense expenditure has to catch up in order to bring them to the level of 2%
of GDP pledged by the government. As the state debt will deepen, interest payments
will rocket by more than 16% yearly. Taken all together, expenditures will grow by
9.6% over 19992005, a shade faster than nominal GDP , slowly increasing the
government share from 41% of GDP in 1999 to 42% in 2005.
Budget revenues are expected to grow by 9.2% annually, due to the slow growth in
corporate taxes and consumption taxes (VAT and excises). It is significant that personal 
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Nominal GDP Growth 12.1% 9.5%
Expenditure programs Average growth rate in
19931998




Health Care 12.9% 10.0%
Social Security 18.3% 10.7%
Capital Expenditures 10.1% 8.4%
Current Expenditures 12.9% 9.6%
Interest Payments 4.0% 16.5%
Revenues Average growth rate in
19931998
Average growth rate in
19992005
Personal Income Tax 17.3% 13.2%
Corporate Tax -5.1% 7.6%
Social Contributions 16.8% 10.6%
Value Added Tax 11.1% 8.4%
Excise Tax 12.6% 6.7% (14.4%)
Total Revenues 10.3% 9.2%  (10.0%)
Table 1. The Actual and Projected Date of Revenue and Expenditure Increase (in %)income taxes represent the most dynamic portion of budget revenues, followed by social
contributions, even if we did not include future hikes in social contribution rates as hinted
by the government. Higher personal taxes and higher social contributions of course
project a further upsurge in the labor tax burden and in a higher rate of unemployment.
Budget revenues may be boosted by an aggressive convergence of the Czech excises to
the average European level (see below).
Chart 1 provides the fiscal outlook of the central government deficits in a nutshell.
We distinguish between primary deficit (before any interest on state debt is paid) and
overall deficits, which includes such payments. The primary deficit jumps from 0.5% to
2% of GDP in 1999 and then slowly increases, nearly to 3%, where it hovers between
2002 and 2005  if we assume no change in government policy. As the state debt
increases each year, however, interest paid doubles, from 1% in 1998 to almost 2% of
GDP in 2005. This would stabilize the overall deficits at around 4.5% of GDP . In nominal
terms, such deficits mean that central-government deficits would break the CZK 100 bil.
(USD 2.8 bil.) mark in 2002, and reach almost CZK 150 bil. (USD 4.2 bil.) in 2005. 
Although the numbers above do not differ significantly from the governments own
figures, we are less optimistic that GDP growth will resolve the Czech fiscal conundrum.
As long as expenses are correlated with wages and grow faster than revenues, the state
budget will find it very difficult to meet its commitments.
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Chart 1. Primary and Overall Deficit of the State Budget, 199820054. Some Policy Changes May Worse the Deficits
In our model we have not, thus far, foreseen any change in the governments policy.
This is obviously too bold assumption. Therefore, to make such a forecast more
interesting, we have added two new features: First, we analyze a couple of new
government initiatives that were approved in late April. The Cabinet approved the
"Agriculture Sector Strategy" that calls for increased state subsidies to the sector to the
tune of 1.3% of GDP (currently it stands at 0.8% of GDP). Further, the "Medium Term
Strategy for Transport" was approved. In a rather clandestine way, it foretells financing
new programs amounting to 0.5% of GDP . Also, the Ministry of Industry and Trade had
its soft-loan and subsidy package approved. These initiatives increase the deficit by a
combined 1.01.5% of GDP in respective years, bringing it to almost 6% of GDP in
2003. It is interesting how easily and how stealth-like the Cabinet approved programs
that so significantly deteriorate the fiscal outlook. 
On the positive side, there seems to now be an agreement that excise taxes will be
increased to European levels. Currently, they are about two thirds of the target value,
therefore, they can be increased by 50% in the course of a few years. That could boost
tax revenues by CZK 10 bil. in 2000, by almost CZK 50 bil. in 2003, and even by
CZK 6065 bil. in 2005, thus canceling the effect of the new spending programs
described above. Even in such a case, the government deficit would stabilize at a fairly
high level of 4% GDP .
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Chart 2. Influence of the Projected Policy Changes on the Future Fiscal Outlook5. Forgotten Sins?
The current Cabinet must, moreover, one day face the legacy of previous
governments that have accumulated the so-called "hidden debts," which will amount,
according to the World Bank, to about CZK 270 bil. (15% of GDP) by the end of 1998.
The debt consists of the outstanding liabilities of the governments off-budget funds
(Konsolidacni Banka, Ceská Financní and Ceská Inkasní) and of government-guaranteed
loans. The government debt would, in fact, double to 30% of GDP , if we added the
hidden debt to the officially recognized debt. According to the Ministry of Finance, the
hidden debt will be eventually securitized, so future budget expenditures would
incorporate servicing the costs of this debt and would be more predictable. If we
conservatively estimate that the government will service only the interest and never
retire the debt as such, then the budget expenditures would be increased by
approximately 1.5% of GDP in 2000 (see Chart 4). As interest payments remain flat in
nominal terms, their share in GDP slowly declines and the yearly overall budget deficits
stabilize at around 5% of GDP .
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Chart 3. Influence of the Hiddn Debt on the Future Fiscal Outlook
^
^
^6. Living Beyond our Means (The Unbearable Lightness 
of Being)
As we demonstrated, Czech fiscal policy is headed for substantial deficits in the
future. Deficits will occur if the government simply extends the current policies and they
will be even higher if it adopts some of the recently proposed measures. Moreover, off-
budget institutions will, in all likelihood, continue to generate substantial losses in the
future. As they are explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the state, the government budget
should better prepare for high and unpredictable expenditures, similar to the CZK 15 bil.
required by Konsolidacní Banka this year. Therefore, all of our estimates should be taken
as an optimistic alternative.
It has been often noted that the Czech Republic has ample room for deficit financing,
as its debt is relatively low, even if we allow for the so-called hidden debts. A strategy of
aggressive deficit financing would be, however, quite risky. As debt is accumulated,
servicing cost balloon, and the government will find it increasingly difficult to slash other
expenditures to stabilize deficits. Indeed, as Chart 4 shows, state debt rises relentlessly
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Chart 4. Possible Scenarios of the Public Debt
^in all alternatives. If we disregard the "hidden debts" and do not change the current
policies, the state debt reaches almost 50% in 2010, as compared to a mere 14% in
1998. However, as the "hidden debts" cannot be hidden forever, and the government has
pledged to increase spending on some programs, this scenario is far from certain. If, to
the other extreme, the government acknowledges the hidden debts, increases spending
according to its latest proposals and brings the excise taxes to European levels, the state
debt will expand from 30% to more than 60% in the same period. 
Quagmire
The fiscal outlook is thus scary/quite terrifying. Even though our analysis has left out
the future annual deficits of all "transformation" institutions  and we have not
contemplated pension reform  we have identified deficits of about 5% of GDP each year
that are already in the pipeline. Such a relaxed fiscal policy would accumulate debt
amounting to 5065% of GDP in just a decade. The experience of other countries
(Belgium, Italy, ) shows that this would certainly lead to higher cost in the future, when
the interest is paid, without necessarily improving the economys competitiveness or the
welfare of the citizenry.
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